

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	East Germany	REPORT	<input type="text"/>	25X1
SUBJECT	Werk fuer Fernmeldewesen HF (OSW) Production and Personnel	DATE DISTR.	12 May 1953	
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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
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1. At the end of 1951, the planned production of T2 television sets by Sachsenwerk Radeberg was completely disrupted, when most of the kinescopes delivered to the plant from the Werk fuer Fernmeldewesen HF were rejected. As a result of this wholesale condemnation of the kinescopes, an intensive program of production of test and measuring equipment and kinescopes was immediately inaugurated at the HF plant. Prior to that time, the production of test and measuring equipment had been neglected because of the priority given the T2 production.
2. The HF plant authorities first attempted to place the blame for the defective kinescopes on the workshops. Then it was decided that faulty cathode paste had been used, and Wetzel, chief of the cathode shop, along with several others, was discharged. The HF plant's Party organization, with the aid of Dr. Kromrey, claimed that it was a case of deliberate sabotage; at a small meeting of the SED, Dr. Kromrey succeeded in convincing the others that the case should be submitted directly to the Central Committee, without the knowledge or concurrence of the plant's general director, Rudi Mueller.
3. At the beginning of 1952, the Russian management began to concentrate on metal ceramic tube production, beginning with copies of the LD 11 and LD 12 triodes and proceeding to the production of metal ceramic diodes. This plan also failed, mainly because of low grade ceramic material, according to technical experts. As a result of this failure, Technical Director Lorenz was dismissed and replaced by Dr. Schiller, who had returned from the USSR in December 1951. Dr. Schiller, although not outstanding in development and research, proved to be a good organizer; he created an "auxiliary organization" and subsequently reported the following achievements:

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25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AEC		OSI	EW	X	ORR	EW	X
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- a. Metal ceramic tube production had begun to show a steady increase; apparently technical difficulties had been overcome.
 - b. The production crisis in the kinescope section had been overcome, according to Director Mueller.
 - c. The thermal grid emission of P50 tubes, when operated under exacting conditions, was successfully eliminated by surface treatment of the grid wire.
 - d. The decrease in emission losses and the breaks in the filaments of the 6AG7, 6AG7, 6K5 (?), etc., was also allegedly successfully effected.
4. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether Dr. Schibler will succeed where Director Mueller failed, in making the HF plant the largest tube factory in East Germany. Should he succeed, however, the experimental branch (Versuchswerk) would be superfluous and would be merged with another enterprise.

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2. Comment: This statement is doubted by the transmitter section of the HF plant.

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